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EROS AND PROTESTANTISM: FROM NYGREN TO MILBANK 
 
Risto Saarinen 
 
In his new book The Future of Love the Anglican radical orthodox theologian John Milbank 
praises pope Benedict XVI's encyclical letter Deus caritas est. For Milbank, already the 
pope's choice of this topic exhibits “an unswerwing boldness combined with a calm 
judgment”. In this encyclical, agape is also eros; at the same time, eros displays features of 
agape. In Milbank's reading, this “inseparable unity of eros and agape” in papal thinking 
deserves high praise.
1
 
 
Unlike Milbank, the Protestant theology of love has traditionally focused on the purity and 
primacy of agape and sought to separate eros from it. The standard Protestant story tells that 
Luther and Lutheranism turned away from the Roman Catholic model of reciprocity and merit 
and created a new view of pure divine love which creates the lovability of its object. In this 
concept of divine love the Pauline agape supersedes the views of eros originating from 
Hellenistic antiquity. The Protestant purity of agape is, therefore, different from the Latin 
view of caritas, a comprehensive concept of love which represents a synthesis of Christianity 
and classical antiquity. The caritas synthesis presupposes an analogical relationship among 
the various concepts and phenomena of love: friendship, affection, need-love and gift-love 
are on the one hand distinct from one another, but they also have a family resemblance. This 
family resemblance is co-ordinated and held together by the so-called “order of love” (ordo 
caritatis) according to which higher objects are loved more than lower ones. In terms of 
caritas synthesis, the act of loving (amare, diligere) nevertheless remains similar in different 
kinds of loves.
2
 Protestant theology of love denies these similarities, since the Pauline agape 
is fundamentally different from the Hellenistic eros.  
 
Anders Nygren's Agape and Eros is the most famous representative of this project aiming at 
the purity of Christian agape. Some Luther scholars have argued that Luther's central 
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theological problem can be understood as the search for pure love.
3
 The search for pure love 
is, however, in itself a highly ambivalent theological project. Is it possible to understand 
erotic love or some other forms of affection in terms of this project? The erotic discourse, as 
it appears in myths and fiction, in literary and artistic creations is extremely complex and 
many-faced. Typologising it as “need-love”, “desiring love” or “egoistic love” remains a 
caricature which does not adequately grasp the complex phenomena. When Protestant 
theology defines the Pauline agape as that pure love which is exemplary, truly altruistic and 
God-given, it may only produce a flat and boring concept of one-dimensional love. 
 
For Nygren, eros is a basic motif which represents the human turning from perceptible world 
towards the supernatural. Eros is the fundamentally “upward” orientation of the human soul 
towards the world of values and ideas. As such, eros is connected with becoming God-like. 
The order of salvation in erotic thinking is expressed as upward strive. Three characteristics 
thus define the eros motif which Nygrens considers to be Platonic in origin: 1) love as upward 
evaluative strive, 2) love as human road towards God and 3) love as egocentric in nature. 
Although Nygrens claims that these characteristics remain descriptive, it is unmistakable that 
he wants to show the superiority of agape motif in comparison with eros. Agape, as it appears 
in the New Testament, does not strive but remains spontaneous. It does not consider the 
inherent value of its object. Agape is creative and communicative. It cannot be a human road 
towards God, but it expresses God's way of approaching human beings.
4
 
 
In Nygren's view, Western theology confused eros with agape when medieval Catholicism 
thought in terms of caritas, comprehensive love. During the Renaissance, eros was reborn as 
an autonomous motif. Luther's theology and the Reformation means the return of agape motif. 
In Luther's thought, a “Copernican turn” occurs: Christian love is no egocentric strive, but 
agape remains a theocentric love of God towards human beings. Luther's theology can be seen 
as a struggle against self-love. Genuine Christian love is for Luther spontaneous and freely 
flowing. It cannot be legalistic and it does not strive for happiness in an “eudaimonistic” 
fashion. The Christian is, according to Nygren's memorable comparison, like a pipeline 
through which God's love flows from above and towards one's neighbours. (Nygren 1966, 
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585-587, 605, 619-622). 
 
Two difficulties are apparent in Nygren's narrative. First, when he constructs agape as an 
ideal and pure form of love he performs himself a move which he criticizes with regard to 
eros. Nygren evaluates agape as the superior form of love, equipping agape with a 
value-based attitude. Let us say, for instance, that Mother Teresa's love of the poor in Calcutta 
is a more genuine or purer love than the affection which we feel in drinking good wine. Thus 
we evaluate the two loves in terms of our appreciation of them, judging that Mother Teresa's 
love expresses a deeper and higher value than the enjoyment of wine. But this means that we 
evaluate the excellency of Mother Teresa's actions so that our admiration is not agapistic but 
value-based and in that sense erotic. Thus we recognize agape only through using a scale or 
order of love, this scale being itself an instance of eros. 
 
Second, Nygren is not fair with regard to Plato and the so-called Platonic eros. Plato does not 
regard eros to be fundamentally egocentric. On the contrary, he says that loving people help 
their neighbours and are even prepared to die for others.
5
 Eros is operative in “cultivating 
courtesy and weeding out brutality, lavish of kindliness and sparing of malevolence, affable 
and gracious”. Of all gods eros “has the best title to our service, for he ... is the friend of man; 
he is our great ally, and it is he that cures us of those ills whose relief opens the way to man’s 
highest happiness”. In the dialogue between Socrates and Diotima on love an upward scale 
appears, but the dialogue clearly affirms the complexity of love’s objects, which can be ugly 
or beautiful, valuable or lacking in value. (Plato 1994, 197d, 189d, 201a-212b). 
 
In Plato’s thinking of eros, no abstract basic motif appears, but the philosopher displays a 
playful and many-sided approach to love. Many different voices give their opinion regarding 
eros in Symposion. These opinions are mutually complementary and they construct a field of 
playful plurality in which fair and foul, egoistic and altruistic, striving and gift-giving, natural 
and un-natural are discussed from various perspectives. Eros thus appears as playful and 
pluralistic: it escapes definitions and plays tricks with straightforward thinkers. Nygren’s 
postulate of eros motif cannot grasp this plurality. His postulate of a one-dimensional upward 
strive does not capture Plato or Hellenism, but it remains a puritanic counterpart of that agape 
which is given as the Christian ideal. Nygren only manages to create an equivocation in the 
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concept of love: in his reading, eros and agape become two separate concepts, connected only 
by their opposition. 
 
The historical shortcomings of Nygren’s argument have been discussed often enough. Later 
writers from Karl Barth to Benedict XVI  have, however, remained captive to the basic 
opposition between eros and agape, or human love and divine love (Lindberg 2008, 159-162). 
While the disjunction of the two concepts remains flat and unhistorical, it succeeds in 
distinguishing the world of myth (eros) from the world of non-violent and non-mythical 
divine love (agape).  The benefits of making this distinction have kept Nygren’s work alive 
and have contributed to the fact that later theologians who do not agree with Nygren 
nevertheless continue to employ his twofold concept of love. 
 
Among Nygren’s Protestant critics, C. S. Lewis’s The Four Loves exemplifies this 
phenomenon in a popular but theologically subtle manner. Lewis first divides love into two 
realms, those of gift-love and need-love. He says that divine love is gift-love, whereas 
need-love is often selfish and human. He adds, however, that it is very proper for humans to 
approach God in terms of need-love, whereas it would be arrogant to claim that one can love 
God in other ways. Lewis further adds, quoting Thomas a Kempis, that “the highest does not 
stand without the lowest”: we cannot conceive higher forms of love without seeing their 
connection with the lower forms. Gift-love may be the highest form of love, but it may also 
become a demon. A person saying “I do not need anything” or “my life consists of only 
sacrificing myself for others” does not necessarily display pure love or altruism, but he or she 
may remain constrained by demonic illusions.
6
 Although Lewis is critical of Nygren’s pure 
motifs, he does not aim to present a completely new classification. Gift-love and need-love, 
agape and eros, remain his concepts, although in a qualified fashion. 
 
C. S. Lewis is an interesting figure because he, like Nygren, wrestles with the basic difference 
between Hellenism and Christianity. The former represents myth and eros, whereas the latter 
aims at non-violent agape. While Nygren works out a complete disjunction between the two, 
Lewis wants to retain the connection between myth and Christianity. The benefit of this 
approach is that eros can be integrated to the Christian concept of love. But there is also a 
price to pay, as the sacrificial and violent aspects of the myth continue to exercise their 
influence in the Christian narrative. Lewis has described his conversion to Christianity in 
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terms of realizing that the myth can be true, so that the pagan myths are shadows of the 
fundamentally true narrative of Christianity.
7
 
 
The influence of this self-understanding is visible in Lewis’s Narnia series. In its first volume, 
The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe, the hero and Jesus figure, Aslan, needs to sacrifice 
himself in order to pay for other people’s sins. A quasi-mythical sacrifice in blood is needed 
for the Christian doctrine of forgiveness to emerge. Another and quite different variant of 
Lewis’s wrestling with myth is given in Till We Have Faces, a novel which retells the ancient 
myth of Eros and Psyche. This work is particularly fruitful in attempting to outline a 
constructive Protestant alternative to Nygren’s Agape and Eros.  
 
The myth goes as follows
8
: a king had three daughters of whom the youngest, Psyche, was so 
beautiful that she was worshipped as goddess. When her father consulted the oracle about her 
marriage he received the answer: “Hope for no human son-in-law. You must leave Psyche on 
a mountain to be the prey of a dragon.” This he did. But Venus was jealous of Psyche’s 
beauty and ordered his son Eros to influence the girl so that she would fall in love with the 
basest of men. Eros set out to do this, but fell in love with Psyche himself. Eros had Psyche 
carried off from the mountain to a secret castle. They made love in the night-time, but Psyche 
could never see the face of Eros. Psyche asked that her sisters could visit her in the castle. 
Eros consented reluctantly. 
 
The sisters were jealous to Psyche and wanted to destroy her happiness. Therefore they 
persuaded her that her mysterious lover must be a monster. They advised her to take into her 
bedroom a lamp. When Psyche lit the lamp in the bedroom, she could see the beauty of Eros; 
but he woke up and, seeing his secret revealed, disappeared. Psyche wandered away and fell 
into the hands of her enemy, Venus. Venus made Psyche to do several impossible tasks, for 
instance, bringing back the beauty of Persephone in a box from the lower world. After 
accomplishing this task she looked at the box and lost consciousness. After this, Eros came 
back to Psyche and forgave her the curiosity. Venus was also reconciled and they lived 
happily ever after.  
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The myth of Eros and Psyche is a classical archetype and forerunner of soap operas and 
reality television: it emphasizes the accomplishment of impossible tasks and focuses on the 
completely accidental personal fates and commentaries of the participants. Eros is a celebrity 
and secret lover admired by young maidens; he is a great helper but also a wayward 
adventurer.  
 
In Lewis’s version (Lewis 1980, 3-309), this story is told by an elder sister, Orual, who 
represents the old Greek world of myths, order and violence. Gods are venerated and 
appeased by means of sacrifices; law, order and use of reason are necessary in order that the 
civil society can be protected from anarchy. Her sister Psyche is an idealist who believes in 
comprehensive love and personal religious commitment. Orual regards her sister’s love 
relationship to be catastrophic and morally wrong: in Orual’s eyes, the invisible lover is 
simply abusing Psyche. The unfolding of the story proves, however, that Orual is wrong. 
Psyche is displayed as the bride of Christ: she believes in non-violent love and can see 
beyond the horizon of rational control and myth-based moral norms. The secret lover Eros 
proves out to be “the Bridegroom – the god himself” (Lewis 1980, 115). 
 
In Till We Have Faces, Lewis outlines the violent world of the myth as Orual’s preference, 
whereas the non-violent culture of love and Christian ideals is represented by the curious and 
erotically active girl, Psyche. In a confusing and even disturbing manner, Eros is nothing less 
than Christ who sides with Psyche. Thus Eros and purely agapistic love belong together, 
whereas the mythical and violent old world remains jealous and even hostile to their 
affectionate union. This bold move has disturbed the conventional readers of C. S. Lewis. It 
may also be that Till We Have Faces represents a different solution to the problem of myth 
than The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe. While in Narnia Christianity is connected with 
death and sacrifice, Till We Have Faces pushes sacrificial violence to the side of the myth. 
Some positive connection with myth remains in both works: while The Lion, the Witch and 
the Wardrobe employs the death myth positively, Till We Have Faces highlights the erotic 
myth. The figure of Christ as a counterpoint to myth is dramatically different in the two 
works: whereas Aslan is the king and lawgiver who performs a sacrificial death, Eros is the 
invisible bridegroom. They both give themselves, but while the offer of Aslan is sacrificial 
and rule-abiding, the mutual self-giving of Eros and Psyche expresses a playful, abundant and 
non-violent gift which transcends the worldly rules. 
 7 
 
Like John Milbank and Benedict XVI, C. S. Lewis wants to connect eros with agape. Such an 
“inseparable unity” goes against Nygren’s thinking, particularly in the erotic shape which 
Lewis gives to this unity in Till We Have Faces. But it also needs to be seen how Lewis’s 
dramatic reconfiguration of eros and agape employs the underlying dichotomy between 
gift-love and need-love. The dramatic effect arises from the fusion of the two. In Orual’s 
mind, need-love and dutiful altruism remain properly separate. But Orual is wrong: true love 
does not arise from their separation, but from their fusion. Given this, the theological position 
of Nygren does not express Christianity but the Puritan-minded pagan perspective of Orual.  
In this manner Till We Have Faces is even more critical to Nygren than The Four Loves. 
 
The dual perspective of Orual and Psyche in Till We Have Faces is astonishingly similar to 
the dichotomy between Hellenistic myths and Christianity elaborated in René Girard’s 
anthropological work.
9
 Girard’s theory of violence is highly relevant for Protestant theology 
since, as I have argued elsewhere, his portrayal of sacrificial Hellenism and the peaceful 
message of Jesus resembles the Lutheran distinction between law and gospel.
10
 Girard 
develops a dichotomy which in many ways manages to avoid the shortcomings of Nygren’s 
dualism between Hellenistic eros and Christian agape. 
 
Girard sets out to explain religion as a means of controlling violence. In human societies, 
primitive as well as modern, violence has a fundamentally “mimetic” character: when the first 
person casts a stone, others imitate him. Violence is thus contagious and easily contaminates 
everyone in a community, either in the form of blood revenge or simply as escalating 
aggression. Acute violence can only be prevented by using force. The spread of violence thus 
seems to be inevitable, as justice employs the force of good violence for controlling the evil. 
If no institutional justice exists, the society may develop a ritual in which good violence is 
displayed. This is the sacrificial mechanism in which the controlled bloodshed represents 
good violence which can purify the society and prevent the bad violence from erupting. Blood 
contaminates and stains, but within the sacrificial ritual blood is capable of purifying. Bad 
violence can, therefore, be controlled by employing the ritual of good violence. (Girard 1977, 
23-24, 36-38). 
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Religion which is based on a sacrificial mechanism can thus function as a ritual or rule of law 
which prevents violence and displays the human control over destructive aggression. 
Religion, therefore, revolves around sacrificial mechanisms in which blood or some other 
symbol is dealt with in a manner which represents the community’s control over unlimited 
bloodshed. An adequate sacrificial ritual functions like a vaccination: a too small dosage 
cannot prevent the disease, but a too large portion can cause the disease instead of preventing 
it. (Girard 1977, 39-67, 289-290). While sacrificial religion thus controls violence, it also 
perpetuates the rule of violence, since the dynamics of good and bad violence is continued in 
the sacrificial acts of victimage and scapegoating. Girard discusses extensively the Oedipus 
myth and comes to the conclusion that it is not a myth of erotic bondages, but a myth about 
violence. For Girard, the “hidden basis of the myths is not sexual”; what is actually masked in 
Oedipus and other myths is the “collective violence” which has to be handled with sacrificial 
practices. (Girard 1977, 118). 
 
In the proclamation of Jesus Girard finds an explicit and conscious criticism of traditional 
sacrificial mechanisms. When Jesus quotes the prophetic verse: “I desire mercy, not sacrifice” 
(Matt. 9:13), he aims at criticizing the scapegoating mechanism. Jesus proclaims “what has 
been hidden since the foundation of the world” (Matt. 13:35). This proclamation consists 
firstly in arguing that when violence is controlled with violence and sacrifice, the vicious 
circle is never broken. Secondly, Jesus proclaims that there is a non-sacrificial God who calls 
for a counter-culture, that is, an alternative to the sacrificial religion. Jesus goes against the 
received myths. The example par excellence is the crucifixion: the culture of perpetual 
violence executes the prophet, but in so doing the inherent violence of humankind is revealed. 
It becomes visible in what sense the non-sacrificial and pacifistic message of Jesus offers an 
alternative to and a way out of this chain of violence (Girard 1987, 187-109, 231-235). 
 
Nygren, Lewis and Girard favor somewhat dualistic explanations of religious reality, but in so 
doing their constellations of eros and sacrificial behavior differ considerably from each other. 
While for Nygren the opponent of genuine Christian love is myth and eros, Girard regards 
violence to be that core of mythology which is counteracted in the gospels. Like Girard, C.S. 
Lewis in Till We Have Faces contrasts myth with genuine Christianity. Eros, however, does 
not represent merely a myth for Lewis, but it finally becomes the symbol of the bridegroom, 
the Christ. The pagan spectator, Orual, is not characterized by a wrong kind of love, but she is 
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characterized as lacking in love and as “greedy, blood-gorged” (Lewis 1980, 282) like the 
violent pagan god of her polis.  
 
While Nygren relates the ideological problems of Hellenism to its concept of eros, Lewis and 
Girard identify these problems in terms of sacrificial violence. For Lewis, love in its totality 
remains on the side of Christianity. This constellation does not abolish the distinction 
between eros and agape, as The Four Loves clearly shows. But the relative importance of this 
distincion is for Lewis significantly different from Nygren. The contrast between Hellenism 
and Christianity which Nygren seeks to locate in the concept of love can be much more 
adequately expressed in Girard’s theory of violence. The myths are not about love; they are 
about violence. Christianity in general and Protestantism in particular need to refute myths 
and de-mythologisize itself. In so doing it is not theologically adequate to abolish eros. 
 
Let us briefly come back to John Milbank’s reading of Deus caritas est. Among the 
contemporary thinkers, Jean-Luc Marion
11
 and Milbank have recently pleaded for the unity of 
love. In this unity, eros needs to be seen as an aspect of the broader Christian concept of love. 
Protestant theologians need to affirm this quest and reject puritanic concepts of love. The 
term “puritanic” is illuminative in several ways: love is not a pure concept but a complex 
term united by several analogical meanings. For this reason, the quest for pure love may be 
misleading – in saying this I also disagree with the Luther scholars quoted above. At the same 
time one needs to see that Benedict XVI in fact employs several aspects of Nygren’s concepts 
of eros and agape. In Deus caritas est the pope aims at refuting Nietzsche’s famous claim that 
Christianity has poisoned and destroyed eros (Benedict 2005, §3-4). When Benedict 
rehabilitates eros in its differentiated unity with agape, he clearly deviates from Nygren, but 
he also continues to understand love with in terms of these basic concepts.  
Benedict (2005, §7) says  that “man cannot live by oblative, descending love alone. He 
cannot always give, he must also receive. Anyone who wishes to give love must also receive 
love as a gift.” This point comes very close to C. S. Lewis’s elaboration of gift-love and 
need-love in The Four Loves. Lewis and Benedict are critical of Nygren’s position and want 
to integrate eros on the side of agape rather than connect it with the Nietzschean and 
Hellenistic myths. At the same time they perpetuate the conceptual dualities created by 
Nietzsche and Nygren. While Nygren was profoundly wrong in his elaboration of eros, his 
continuing legacy consists in pointing out a dichotomy which needs to be redefined and 
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remedied but which cannot be simply ignored or bypassed. Some duality continues to haunt 
our Christian concept of love. The fundamental opposition does not, however, concern eros 
and agape but love and violence, eros/agape and thanatos. 
